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(e.g., using various types of trackers), In such a case we 
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Various types of compromise have been studied but until 
now attention has centred on the inference of exact infor-
mation from pennitted queries. In this paper we introduce 
a new type of compromise, the 'relative' compromise: a set 
of records is relatively compromised with respect to a field 
X if the relative order of magnitude of the X -values of the 
set is known This paper shows that even when exact 
infonnation is protected, relative infonnation may be 
accessible. We consider several sets of conditions under 
which this compromise can occur using SUM type of quer-
ies of fixed query set size, as well as some of the possible 
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INTRODUCTION 
A database D is a finite set of N records (or tuples) in which 
'each record has a finite number of fields (or attributes). For 
the purpose of this study we shall assume that one of these 
fields or attributes, say X, is to be kept secret for all records 
i in the database. Furthermore, we assume that the ele-
ments Xi ~ X are real numbers. 
A statistical database is a database in which only statis-
tical types of queries are allowed, such as COUNT, SUM, 
A VG, MIN, MAX. Such a query q(S; X) operates on the 
values of the attribute X of a subset S (called the query set) 
of the database. The query set is selected by a characteris-
tic formula. For a more detailed explanation of the terms 
used here refer to Denning (1982), Chapter 6. We shall not 
exclude the possibility of using key values in the character-
istic formula. For simplicity we identify both a characteris-
tic fonnula and its corresponding query set by the same 
symbol; and we shall write q(S) instead of q(S; X) when X 
is understood. 
A statistical database is to be used for statistical pur-
poses only and the X-values of the individual records are to 
be protected from disclosure. If a disclosure ofaX-value of 
any of the individual records occurs we say that the data-
base has been compromised. Various types of compromise 
have been defined (Davida, et aI., 1978; Denning, 1982; 
Dobkin, et aI., 1979), for example: 
Deimition 1: A database is said to be positively com-
promised, or simply compromised, if one or more individu-
als can have their X-values associated with them. 
Definition 2: A database is negatively compromi.~ed if it 
is known that some particular value is not the X-value of a 
particular individual. 
Definition 3: If all individual records in a subset S of a 
database D can be compromised we say that the subset S is 
completely compromised. 
In the absence of any restrictions on the queries a 
statistical database can be compromised simply by mak-
ing the query SUM (S) where S is a characteristic fonnula 
that uniquely identifies some individual i. Alternatively, 
we could deduce the value of Xi from SUM (D) - SUM (D 
- 5>. It is therefore obvious that to protect the field X we 
need to place some restrictions on the allowed queries. To 
prevent the above compromise we restrict the query set 
sizek=l51 to be within the range [2,N - I],andtakinginto 
account possible supplementary knowledge of say n - I 
individuals, we further restrict k to 
n:::;k:::;N-n (*) 
Since this restriction is necessary (although not sufficient) 
to prevent compromise we shall assume it from now on. 
Relative Compromise 
It was shown (Denning, 1982) that even for krestricted to 
being close to the value of ~it is possible to compromise a 
database using the techniques of individual, general, dou-
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ble and union trackers. These techniques rest on: 
(a) the ability to ask queries whose query sets overlap 
and/or on 
(b) the ability to ask queries of variable query set size 
(within our general constraint (*» and/or on 
(c) the ability to ask the number of queries needed to 
make the inferences. 
(a) We say that the overlap of a set of queries is A ifany 
two queries of the set have at most A individuals in com-
mon and some two queries have exactly A individuals in 
common. If we restrict the overlap A to )... = 0 then com-
promise using trackers is not possible. However, such a 
database would not be very useful. 
(b) On the other hand, if query set size k were constant 
then compromise is still possible (by exploiting the overlap 
for MIN or MAX queries with cleverly chosen query sets; 
or by solving a system of linear equations for SUM or A VG 
queries) even with the smallest possible overlap)... = I as 
long as there is no restriction on the number of queries 
allowed concerning the individuals involved in the 
queriesl. 
(c) Thus another possible approach is to restrict the 
number of queries allowed. Using this method it was found 
that (positive) compromise can be prevented. In particular, 
Davida et al. (1978) found that it is not possible to com-
promise a database by asking M queries, each of size k, 
concerning N individuals, if no two queries overlap in 
more than one position and if 
On the other hand, Dobkin, Jones and Lipton (1979) 
studied the function M = S(N,k,)...!), where M is the smallest 
number of SUM queries that suffices to compromise the 
database, k is the query set size (fixed), A is the query set 
overlap, and L is the number of X-values known a priori 
to the user. They found that: 
(a) S(N,~I,O):S 2k-l, 
(b) S(N,~I,I):S2k-2, 
(c) S(N,k,)... + (1,11.,2(1 - 1)::;:; 2k, 
(d) S(N',H.,).,). - I):S S(N,~ 1,0), 
N?:.k2 -k+ 1 
N?:.(k-I)2+2 
N?:. k2A + 2(1 
N'?:, H2 
They also showed that compromise is impossible if 
k2 _1 k+1 
N <----n- + -2-
That is, in this case S(N,k,)...,O) = 00. 
Taking into account possible supplementary knowl-
edge of l individuals, then Dobkin, Jones and Lipton 
(1979) showed that S(N,k,)...,!) = 00, that is, compromise is 
not possible if 
k2_(/+ [)2 k+l+ 1 
N< 2>. +-2-
In this paper we consider the restriction on the number 
of queries for SUM type of queries. The compromise of a 
database using only SUM queries of fixed query set size k 
always involves the construction of some [linearly inde-
pendent queries concerning I individuals. Such a set of 
queries can be expressed as a system of llinearly inde-
pendent equations in l unknowns. Solving these equations 
leads to a complete compromise of the l individuals. To 
prevent this compromise we could restrict the number of 
queries allowed so that in any system of equations derived 
from the queries there would always be at least one more 
unknown than the number of equations. This control could 
be implemented either in a static or a dynamic way. We 
shall now consider such a system where we allow SUM 
queries as long as no subset of all queries asked could be 
written as a system of lIinearly independent equations on I 
unknowns. We shall show that even this restriction does 
not prevent a new type of compromise, the "relative 
compromise". 
Def"mition 4: A subset S uS] > 1) of a database is 
relatively compromised if the relative order of magnitude of 
the individuals in the subset is known. 
Theorem 1: Let S be a subset of a database, I S] = k + I. 
Then a subset of k individuals of S can be relatively com-
promised using only k SUM queries with fixed query set 
size k 
Proof: Construct queries that can be written as the 
following system of k equations in k + 1 unknowns. 
X2+X3+ +Xk+Xhl=ql 
X 1 +X3+ +Xk+ Xk+l=q2 



















Let Xk+l be the column vector 'with entries all equal to 
Xk+l and let Xbe the column vectQr with entriesxl,x2, ,,,,Xk' 
Then 
(J -l)X~ Q - X,~, 






(k-l l-/)Q- k-I Xk+l 
Q*- k~ 1 Xk+l 
Thus X l ,x2, ... , Xk can be expressed in terms of Xk+l as 
I 
Xl = qf - k _ 1 Xk+l 
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Knowing 4;we can find the relative order of magnitudeof 
the elements XI.t"2 •.. ,' Xk (it will be the same as the relative 
order of magnitude of the corresponding qr values). 
Example 
Suppose we make three queries about four individuals 
with the following results 
X 2 + X3 + x4= 1050 
Xl +x}+x4=70 
Xl + X2 + X4= 1020 
Then 
XI = 20 -+X4 , 
X2 = 1000 -Tx4 
X3 = 50 - tx4 
and so Xl < X3 < x2_ 
Note that in some situations a relative compromise with 
supplementary knowledge could lead to a more serious 
compromise of the database. Consider for example the 
situation when it is known that Xi are all nonegative and 
that any individual with ~' > 900 has AIDS while any 
individual with Xi < 100 does not have AIDS. 
Then we could infer from the above example that: 
O::::;x4 ::::;40 
o ::::;x l ::::;20 
980::::;X2::::; 1000 
30::::;X3::::;SO 
and hence that the individual corresponding to X2 must 
have AIDS while none of the other individuals involved in 
the queries have AIDS. 
Note also that we know rather more than just the order 
of the X -values, in fact, we know the differences Xi ~ XI 
(= q; ~ qO of any two of them. Hence knowing one of the 
values (if for example the user could plant his/her own X-
value into the queries) would result in the complete 
compromise of all the individuals involved in the queries. 
The next theorem shows that relative compromise is 
possible even if we further restrict the number of queries 
allowed. 
Theorem 2: Let S be a subset of a database, 151 = k+L 
Then a subset of k individuals of S can be relatively com-
promised using only k SUM queries with fixed query set 
size Ie. 
Proof: Construct queries that can be written as the 
following system of k equations on l+1 unknowns. 
X2 +X3 + ... +X. +Xk+l + ... +Xk+l= ql 
Xl +X3 + ... +Xk +XhJ + ... +Xk+I= q2 
This can be written as 
(J~I)X=Q~Xk+1 
where X is the column vector with entries XI,xb ... X. and 
Xh1is the column vector with entries all equal tOXhl + Xk+l 
+ ... +Xhl' 
Then 
I 
X = (k. _ I J - JXQ ~ Xk+/) 
=Q*-k~t X,,-.I 
and so 
XI = qt ~ k~t (Xk+1 + ... + Xh/) 
X2 = ql'~ k.~l (Xk+ 1 + ... +Xk+I) 
;~=q;- k~I(Xk+l+",+Xk+l) 
Since we know the values if. we can find the relative 
order of magnitude of the elements XI ,Xl' "" Xk' 
Example 
Consider a set of six individuals and suppose we ask four 
queries revealing the following SUMs. 
X2 +X.,+X4+XS+X6= 1330 
XI +X3+X4+X5+X6= 1080 











and so we deduce that X3 < x j < Xl < X4• 
SO far we have considered only the case of relative 
compromise of queries of fixed query set size k with over-
lap k - L Let us now consider a more general s1tuation-
when the overlap A is not necessarily equal to k ~ 1. 
Firstly, we shall consider the case of m linearly independ-
ent queries concerning 1(> m) individuals, with query set 
size k and overlap A;::: I ~ m. In this case we can make use 
of known results (e.g. Davida, 1978) of (complete) com-
promise using m SUM queries concerning m individuals, 
with query set size k ~ 1 and overlap A - L 
Theorem 3: Let S be a subset of a database, lSI = L If 
m«l) SUM queries with fixed query set size k* and over-
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lap A * lead to the complete compromise of m individuals 
then a subset of m individuals of S can be relatively com-
promised using only m SUM queries of query set size k = k* 
+ /- m with overlap A =)...* + 1- m 
Proof: (i) A > 1- m 
Suppose m individuals of S can be compromised using m 
SUM queries of query set size k* with overlap A *. Let these 
mqueries be written as a system of m linearly independent 
equations 
AX~Q 
where A is aom x m query matrix, Q is a column vector (ql, 
Q2, ... , qm) and X is a column vector (Xl, Xl, .•• , xm). 
Then since A is a nonsingular matrix with constant 
rowsum k*, it has an inverse whose rowsum is constant and 
equal to t.-
Now, we can construct queries corresponding to the 
following equations. 
(I) 
where Y is a column vector whose entries are all equal to 
Xm+l + ... + X m+A_ A,· 
This can be written as 
A'X'~Q' (2) 
where A '= A + Band X'is the concatenated vector of X and 
y. 
Clearly, (2) corresponds to m SUM queries of query set 
size k = k* + A. - A * concerning m + A. - A. * individuals, 
with overlap A.. 
Now we can solve (1) for Xl> X 2 .•. , Xm as 
X = A-'Q' _iy 
" Hence the order of magnitude of X I,X2 ""Xm is the same as 
the order of magnitude of the entries in A-2Q'. 
(ii)A.=I-m 
Then we can use the m x m identity matrix I in place of A 
and the proof is essentially the same as for Case (i). 
Example 
Complete compromise is possible by asking the following 
seven queries about seven individuals of a database (A. * = 
l,k*=3). 
XI +X2 +X3 =ql 
Xl +X4 +Xs =q2 
XI +Xs +X6 =q3 
X2 +Xj +X7 =q4 
X, +X6 +X7 =q5 
Xl +X4 +X7 =q6 
X2 +X4 +X6 =q7 
We can write this as 
AX~Q 
where the query matrix 
\ \ \ 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 \ 0 0 
\ 0 0 0 \ \ 0 
A~ 0 \ 0 0 \ 0 \ 
0 0 \ 0 0 \ \ 
\ 0 0 \ 0 0 \ 
0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 
If ql = 500, q) = 140,q4 = 250,q5 = 270,q6 = 140,q7 = 230 
then XI = 100,x2 = 200,x4 = 0, Xs = 10, X6 = 30, X7 = 40. 
We shall use the matrix A to form seven queries about nine 
individuals as follows. Let X be the column vector 
(XI,x2,x3,x4,xsh,x7) and let Y be the column vector with 
entries all equal to Xg + X9' Then we can construct the SUM 
queries corresponding to 
AX+ Y~Q' 
Then X =A-IQ' - ~ (Xg +X9) where 
r 
2 -\ 2-\ 
2 -\ -\ 2 
2 2 -\ -\ 
A-'=!· -I 2 -1 -I "l-\ 2 2 2 
-\ -\ 2-\ 






















Suppose the responses to the SUM queries were 
550,260,190,300,320,190,280. Then we can express 
X I ,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7 in tenns of Xg + X9 as 
700 I 
XI =T-"3(Xg+X9) 
1300 I x2 = () -3 (Xg +~) 
1300 I 
X3= -6- -3 (XR +X9) 
100 I 







and SOX4<X5<X6<X7<XI <xz< = Xl' 
Note that the relative compromise of Theorem 3 is only 
possible for overlap A. ~ 1 - m or, equivalently, for the-
number of queries m ~ I - A.. Thus there is a trade off 
between the number of queries and the overlap. 
If we allow m queries about m + 1 individuals and m is 
such that the block design (m + I, k, A.) (Street, 1977) exists 
then it is possible to get relative compromise given the 
overlap 1..(>0) and fixed query set size K. However, in this 
case we obtain two disjoint sets of relatively compromised 
individuals. 
Theorem 4: Let S be a subset of a database where I 51 = 
m + I. If the block design (m+ l,k,A) exi~ts then a subset of 
S can be relatively compromised using m SUM queries 
with overlap A and query set size k. 
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Proof: If m,kand A are such that the block design(m + 1, 
k, A) exists then wecan use for the query matrix the first m 
rows of the incidence matrix,D, of the design. For the sake 
of our calculations we assume that the m + 1 st row was also 




where xr = (:X I,x2, .. " x""xm+1) and QT = (Qj,Q2, .. " q"" C), 
where Cis not known. Since Dis the incidence ofan(m + 1, 





D-'- _1 -D' _'_1 - k-A - k(k-Jo..) 
X=(k~ADT- k(k~;..)l)Q 
and so Xj,X2 •.• , X m, X_I can be expressed in terms of the 
unknown C, 
xj = q7-c;C 
where C; takes on two different values, say c[ and C2' Now 
we can compare all the Xi with the corresponding Cj value 
equal to c] and find their relative order of magnitude. 
Similarly, we can also order the elements Xi where the 
corresponding value of c, is c2. 
Example 
Suppose we were allowed to make the 6 SUM queries 
about 7 individuals which correspond to the following set 
of 6 linearly independent equations in 7 unknowns 
Xl +X3+X7= 1300 
Xl +X2+X4=230 
X2 +X3+XS= 1010 
X3+X4+X6'"" 1030 
x 4 +XS+X7= 120 
Xl +xs+x6=210 
The query matrix of these 6 queries corresponds to the first 
6 rows of the 7 x 7 incidence matrix D of the (7,3,1) block 
design. Suppose we asked the query corresponding to the 
last row of the matrix D and the system refused to answer 
that query. That is, we have 
X2+ X6+ X7=C 





















1 0 0 
0 1 0 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
0 0 0 
2 -I -1 
2 2 -1 
-1 2 2 
2 -I 2 
-I 2 -1 
-I -1 2 
-1 -I -I 
1320 - C 
-180 + 2C 
6120 - C 
240-C 
120 - C 
-180 + 2C 








-1 2 -1 
-1 -I 2 
-I -1 -1 
2 -1 -1 
2 2 -1 
-1 2 2 
2 -1 2 
Thus we can calculate the values of X I.x2.x3.x4.x5.x6 andx7 
in terms of C and since C appears with only two different 
coefficients we can find the relative order of magnitude of 
two subsets of the 7 unknowns. namely 
Xs <X4 <Xl <X3 and X2 =X6 <X7' 
Note that if in the above example the sixth query were also 
disallowed so that the result of that query was unknown, 
say C: then we could still get some relative compromise. In 
particular, we could compare Xl withxs ; X7 and X3 withx4. 
This is easily seen by inspecting the last two columns ofthe 
inverse matrix D-l. 
In general, using the incidence matrix of a block design 
(m + 1 ,k,)..) for a query matrix we can guarantee to get 
some relative compromise whenever m + I - n queries 
about m + 1 individuals (with constant query set size kand 
overlap )..) are allowed provided m + 1 > 2n. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have described the idea of relative com-
promise of statistical databases and some conditions under 
which it can occur using SUM type of queries. We also 
showed that in some cases relative compromise with sup-
plementary knowledge can lead to a more serious com-
promise of a database. It remains an open problem to find 
the general conditions (in terms of the number of records in 
a database, query set size, query overlap and the minimum 
number of queries needed) under which relative comprom-
ise can occur. 
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